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Plaintiff filed a complaint for

that lien on June 17, 1982,
Court of Utah County.

foreclosurP of

in the Fourth Judicial District

Summons was issued on August S,

by placing the same in the hands of a qualified person for
service, and was served on August 10, 1982, on defendant
Eldon J. Stubbs Construction, Inc.

Defendants United

Savings & Loan and Provo Land Title were served October 12,
1982.

Respondents were served in April, 1983.

The district

court granted respondents' motion to dismiss under Rule 4 (b)
on the basis that the summons served upon them had not been
issued within three months of filing the original complaint.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF COMPLIED WITH RULE 4 (b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL
IN CAUSING SUMMONS TO BE SERVED ON RESPONDENT.
Rule 4(b)

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reads as

follows:
If an action is commenced by the filing of a
complaint, summons must issue thereon within three
months from the date of such filing.
The summons
must be served within one year after the filing of
the complaint or the action will be deemed
dismissed, provided that in any action brought
against two or more defendants in which personal
service has been obtained upon one of them within
the year, the other or others may be served or
appear at any time before trial.
This action was commenced by the filing of a complaint

2

I

on June 17, 1982.
4(a)

Summons was issued as provided by Rule

by placing it in the hands of a qualified person for

,,er vice on August 5,

1982.

Defendant Eldon J.

construction was served on August 10, 1982.

Summons was

thus issued some 49 days after filing the complaint, well
within the three month period specified by the first
sentence of Rule 4(b).

It was served 54 days after filing

of the complaint, well within the one year period specified
by the second sentence of Rule 4(b).

Service was made on

Jefendants United Savings & Loan and Provo Land Title on
October 12, 1981, and on respondents in April, 1983, also
within a

after the complaint was filed.

Plaintiff was

thus in strict compliance with the rule.
The district court ruled that the action be dismissed
as against respondents because the summons which was served
upon them was not issued within three months of filing the
complaint.

That consideration is, however, irrelevant.

A

surrrrnons was issued within the three months and was served
within one year.

Once plaintiff has accomplished that,

there is an ongoing action before the court.

Under the

:oecond part of the second sentence of Rule 4 (b), plaintiff
may then cause other defendants such as respondents to be

at any time prior to trial.

3

The rule nowhere

requires that a separate summons for each defendant be
issued within three months of filing the complaint.
This court considered facts similar to those in this
case in Redman Warehousing Corp.
No.

15159

file):

v.

Corp.,

(Utah, January 4, 1978, LEXIS States Library,

Utah

In that action proper service had been made upon

Clearfield City and Whirlpool Corp.

Freeport Center

Associates, an additional defendant, challenged service on
it as untimely under Rule 4 (b),

having been made some three

years after commencement of the action.

The court noted

proper service upon two defendants and stated that "[SJ ince
there had not been a trial before the service of summons
upon Freeport,

it would appear that Freeport was properly

brought before the court."
Plaintiff is thus in strict compliance with Rule 4 (b).
Summons was issued within three months.
was made within one year.

Service of summons

Additional defendants,

respondents here, were served prior to trial.
Plaintiff also met the spirit and intent of Rule 4 {b).
It is plainly intended to require a plaintiff to prosecute
an action with reasonable diligence rather than simply
filing a complaint in order to meet a statute of limitations
deadline and then allowing the matter to sit with no action

4

Loward a resolution.

Plaintiff did take action in this case

t,, have the complaint served shortly after it was filed.

Furthermore, respondents were not prejudiced by the
faLt

that the summons served upon them was not issued until

more than three months after the original complaint was
Ei

led.

Even if the summons had been issued within that

time, there was still no requirement that it be served upon
tilern any sooner than it was actually served.

A summons

issued within the three month period could have been held by
the process server until April, 1983, before serving it on
defendants.

Even under the district court's interpretation

of Rule 4

such service would be permitted.

(b)

Respondents

would then be in exactly the same position as they are in
this case.
POINT II
RUlE 4 (b) OF THE UTAH RUlES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE DOES NOT
PROVIDE THAT AN ACTION IS DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO ISSUE
o;UMMONS WITHIN THREE MONTHS AFTER FILING A COMPLAINT.

Even if Rule 4(b)

is interpreted to require issuance of

a summons for respondents within three months of the
commencement of the action, the rule does not provide for
dismissal for failure to do so.

The first sentence of the

[uJe requires issuance within that period.

It is only the

second sentence, however, which deals with service which

s

provides that "summons must be served within one year
or the action will be deemed dismissed

.

In

interpreting the rule as it did to grant respondent's motion
to dismiss,

the district court ignored the period between

the two sentences and applied the penalty of dismissal to
failure to issue a summons.

Once the district court ignored

the distinction between the two sentences,

it then

disregarded the second portion of the second sentence which
allows subsequent service on other defendants.
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF RULE 4(b) IS
INCONSISTENT WITH OTHER RULES WHICH ALLOW ADDITIONAL
DEFENDANTS.TO BE BROUGHT BEFORE THE COURT IN VARIOUS
CIRCUMSTANCES.
The district court's interpretation of Rule 4 (b)

would

require that all summons served on all defendants be issued
within three months after filing of a complaint.

Such an

interpretation would severely limit the scope of other rules
which allow for later amendment,
defendants and interpleader.

joinder, naming unknown

Such a result is obviously not

intended by Rule 4(b).
In many actions, a quiet title action,

for

instance,

unknown defendants are listed in the complaint as "John
Doe''.

The identity of those defendants is frequently not

6

until more that three months after the complaint
filed.

It the trial court's interpretation of Rule 4(b)

were applied to such a situation, it would be impossible to
swcve such a defendant.

Such a result would necessitate the

filing of a separate action against the additional
cJefenc.ants, a procedure not in keeping with a desire for
judicial efficiency or economy.
The district court's interpretation of Rule 4(b) is
also inconsistent with Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
procedure which allows pleadings to be amended under various
circumstances, including amending a complaint to include
additional•defendants.

Rule 15(a) does not require such an

amendment to be made within three months of filing the
original complaint.

If, however, the district court's

of Rule 4(b) stands, all amendments to add an
additional party would have to be made within the three
month period because no summons could be issued after that
time.
This court held

in Drake

No. 15162 (Utah,

.JautJary 3, 1982, LEXIS States Library, Utah file), that the
trn1e periods specified in Rule 4 (b)

did not start running

aqaitJ from the time an amendment to a complaint is filed.
Th- court stated that to allow a new running of Rule 4 (b)

7

"would run counter to Rule 15 (c), which indicates that
matters in amendments relate back to the original pleading."
The court emphasized that "if a simple amendment could start
a new starting point under Rule 4 (b), such rule would be
emasculated by repeated amendments."

Conversely,

district court's interpretation of Rule 4(b)
same effect on Rule 15.

the

would have the

It would seriously limit the

ability to amend a complaint to the period of three months
following the filing of the original complaint.
In Mason

State, 656 P.2d 465

(Utah 1982),

this court

reiterated the long standing rule of construction that
"courts will attempt to give two or more statutes which
ostensibly conflict an interpretation that will give meaning
and effect to each of them."

That rule should be applied in

this case' in interpreting Rule 4(b).

The rule required

issuance of summons within three months.

Once that has been

done, a summons must be served within one year.

Other

defendants may be served at any time prior to trial.

Such

an interpretation is consistent with the actual language of
the rule and does not conflict with Rule 15.
CONCLUSION
The district court erred in its interpretation of Rule
4 (b).

Plaintiff complied with the requirements of the rule.
8

11 surnrnons was issued within three months of filing the
That summons was served within one year of
filin<J

the complaint.

:'rior to trial.

Other defendants were then served

For that reason, the order of dismissal

made by the district court should be reversed and the case
remanded for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,

HAROLD D. MITCHELL
Attorney for Appellant
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